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1. Introduction 
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) emphasize that if governments are not entirely benevolent, it is in the 
interest of voters to design tax systems to control a ‘Leviathan’ government. Glaeser (1996) applies 
the ideas of Brennan and Buchanan to local property taxation and shows that when local government 
bureaucrats act as revenue-maximizing agents, a tax base sensitive to changes in the quality of local 
goods and services produced is favorably for the voters. When housing demand is inelastic property 
taxation reduces waste compared to lump sum taxation because local bureaucrats take into account the 
income feedback via increased property values.1 High quality of local public goods and services is 
associated with increased housing prices, yielding additional property tax revenue, which in turn 
benefits the local public sector bureaucrats. Wilson and Gordon (2003) develop the argument of 
Glaeser (1996) in a richer model that accentuates competition between jurisdictions. In their model, 
interjurisdictional competition reduces waste, raises the utility of the residents, and increases the 
residents’ desired quality of public goods. The argument is analogous to the property tax mechanism, 
as public officials benefit from “taking a smaller slice out of a larger pie” through the Tiebout process 
(Wilson and Gordon 2003: 401). Hoxby (1999) also provides a framework to analyze local costs and 
effort in which property taxation works as a discipline device. In line with Glaeser she also argues that 
property taxation links school quality to school finance and helps to control costs and improve effort in 
schools.  
 
Empirically, the incentive effect of property taxation is hard to identify since most countries have 
property taxation for all local governments. The Norwegian case, however, is well suited for empirical 
analyses because one can compare local governments with and without property taxation. Moreover, 
since many local governments have property taxation for exogenous reasons the data allows taking 
into account potential endogeneity problems. A credible test of the hypotheses put forward by Glaeser 
(1996) and Hoxby (1999) can be conducted.  
 
Borge and Rattsø (2006) present a first investigation of the incentive effects of property taxation 
relying on data from Norwegian local governments. Using linear regression analysis and matching on 
propensity scores they find property taxation to be negatively associated with unit costs in the 
production of a utility service. The current paper takes a different approach, focusing on public sector 
quality rather than costs. We rely on data on test scores from the last year of compulsory schooling for 
                                                     
1 Several American studies find that school quality is capitalized into housing prices, e.g., Figlio and Lucas (2004). 
Brasington and Haurin (2006) provide a recent review of this literature. We are not aware of any Scandinavian studies. 
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two complete cohorts of students to measure public sector quality.2 Primary and lower secondary 
education constitute on average the largest part of local government budgets in Norway (around 
30%).3 Due to rich data availability at the individual level, we are able to control properly for students’ 
family background characteristics as well as school district characteristics. As each school district 
corresponds to one local government, we use the two terms interchangeably.  
 
The empirical strategy of this paper follows the spirit of Hanushek et al. (1996). First, we regress 
district-level fixed effects on student achievement, controlling for individual student demographics. 
Second, we use district level characteristics, including the use of property taxation, to explain the 
variation in the district fixed effects. The key methodological challenge is that districts can decide 
whether or not to levy property taxation. It follows that differences in achievement cannot be causally 
attributed to differences in the presence of property taxation. To handle this endogeneity problem we 
rely on instrumental variable techniques. The instrumental variables are derived from characteristics 
from the tax laws of 1911 and the property tax law of 1975. Specifically we use the historical 
township status of the districts (which governed the ability of the property tax mechanism prior to 
1975) and the share of rural population in the district as instrumental variables.  
 
Our findings are consistent with the theoretical framework put forward by Glaeser (1996) and Hoxby 
(1999). Controlling for a wide range of family- and school district characteristics, notably resource 
use, student achievement is significantly higher in school districts partly funded through a local 
property tax. The results suggest that property taxation works as a disciplining device on local school 
leaders and bureaucrats.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows; Section 2 lines out the empirical strategy and discusses the 
data and institutions; Section 3 presents the results; Section 4 discusses the robustness of the main 
result and section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Empirical strategy, data and institutions 
Our measure of school quality is based on a national written external examination that all Norwegian 
students have to undertake at the end of tenth grade. Although the curriculum includes many different 
                                                     
2 Around 98 % of the students in Norway are enrolled in public schools. Hence private schools are not an alternative to public 
schools and they are not a part of this analysis.  
3 Local governments in Norway are also responsible for preschool education, care for the elderly and some other services, 
such as infrastructure.  
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subjects, both elective and compulsory, written examination is undertaken only in mathematics, 
English, and Norwegian.4 Each student is examined in only one of the three subjects, which is decided 
centrally shortly before the exam. In addition, students are graded by their teachers. Both the exam 
results and the grade points matter for entrance to upper secondary school. Because exam grades are 
set by external examiners, we believe the exam results provide the most accurate picture of actual 
school district quality. The grades set by teachers may be severely biased because of grade inflation 
and relative grading within schools and districts. The student achievement data used in the present 
analysis are exam results for 118,178 students in 425 school districts who finished lower secondary 
school in the school years 2001/2002 and 2002/2003.5 The grading goes from one to six, where six is 
the top score and one is fail. The grades are fairly normally distributed, with a mean of 3.44 and a 
standard deviation of 1.07 across all three subjects. 
 
Unlike local governments in the US, Norwegian local governments are largely financed through block 
grants and regulated income tax sharing. Around 90% of local governments’ revenues are generated 
from central government grants and regulated income taxes. The grants are distributed as block grants 
and are based on objective criteria, partly as income tax equalization and partly as spending 
equalization. The local governments set the income tax rate within a band determined by the central 
government. Since all local governments apply the maximum income tax rate (and have done so since 
1977), grants and income tax revenue consequently appear as given from above. Property taxation is 
not subject to the tax equalization program. User charges and property taxes represent important 
sources of marginal revenue. Borge and Rattsø (2004) analyze the mix of revenues of property 
taxation and fees. The local choice of having property taxation is investigated by Fiva and Rattsø 
(2006) in a model allowing for yardstick competition. The object of the current paper is to investigate 
whether property taxation works as a disciplining device on local school leaders and bureaucrats and 
the remainder of this section is devoted to our empirical strategy. 
2.1. A two step procedure 
When aiming to isolate the incentive effect of property taxation on school quality, it is clearly 
important to control for all other features of the school districts that affect student achievement (and 
might be correlated with property taxation). In particular, it is well known that family background 
                                                     
4 In Norway, we have two official written languages (Norwegian and New Norwegian), and an exam has to be undertaken in 
both of them.  
5 The total number of students finishing in 2001/2002 and 2002/2003 is 122,281 students. Because of missing data on some 
explanatory variables we are left with 118,178 observations in the analysis.  
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characteristics are important determinants of student achievement. In our analysis we are able to 
control for a large number of family characteristics at the individual level.  
 
Our estimation strategy contains two steps and draws on Hanushek et al. (1996).6 In the first step we 
estimate the impact of each student’s family background characteristics (Fij) on individual exam 
performance (Aij) and a separate indicator variable for each school district (Eij):  
 
(i) ij ij j ij ij
j
A F Eδ ς α μ= + + +∑ ,  
 
where Eij are dummy variables that equals 1 if student i lives in school district j and 0 otherwise, and 
ijμ  is an i.i.d. error term. Because of the discrete nature of the student achievement variable, there is a 
rationale for utilizing the ordered probit model. However, when we are interested in the school district 
fixed effects we need to rely on standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  
 
Included in Fij is the student’s gender, age and immigrant status, parent’s education and marital status 
and the household’s income. The school district fixed effects, jα , can be interpreted as student 
performance conditional on family background. In the second step we utilize the school district fixed 
effects to investigate whether school districts that levy residential property tax have a higher level of 
student achievement, our measure of quality of the public sector. The following education production 
function is estimated at the school district level:  
 
(ii) 1 1j j j j jDPTAX R Cα λ β γ θ ε= + + + + ,  
 
where the regressor of primary interest, DPTAXj is a dummy for residential property taxation, and Rj is 
a variable capturing resource use in the school sector. It is crucial not to mix up the effects of 
increased resources spent and the incentive mechanism caused by property taxation. As a measure on 
resource use we include teacher education hours per student. This is a very precise measure on how 
much time the teacher spends in the classroom.7 In addition we control for other characteristics at the 
district level Cj. jε  is an error term. Included in Cj are several school district characteristics that 
                                                     
6 Borjas (1987) applied a similar strategy to study the impact of political and economic conditions in US immigrants home 
countries on US earnings (see Borjas’ footnote 21 for his two step approach).  
7 An alternative measure is expenditures per student which we will use as a robustness check. The raw correlation between 
expenditures per student and teacher education hours per student is 0.76.  
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capture scale effects in the production of education: enrollment, enrollment squared, (the log of) 
population size and travelling distance within zone. The latter variable explicitly captures time used on 
traveling within the school district.8 Since other Norwegian studies have found teacher experience to 
be an important determinant of student achievement in Norway we also include average teacher 
experience as an explanatory variable. Finally, we acknowledge that the controls for family 
background in the first step, given by eq. (i), may not completely capture the effect of demographic 
composition in the district. Unobserved differences in family background across districts may still 
remain in the error term. Therefore, we include several family background characteristics at the school 
district level (median private income, educational level in the population, the unemployment rate and 
the share of the population that is divorced or separated). Descriptive statistics of all variables are 
provided in Appendix Table 1.  
 
Because the actual school district fixed effects are not observed, we need to use the predicted values 
from the first step estimation. Using the first step predicted values introduces an additional error to the 
second step regression because of sampling error of the form ˆ j j jα α η= + , which implies that the 
second step becomes a random components model: 
 
(iii) 1 1j j j j jDPTAX R Cα λ β γ θ ω= + + + +   
 
where j j jω ε η= + . Because the precision in the estimates of jα  will differ across school districts (in 
particular between small and large school districts), jη  will be heteroskedastic. A possible strategy to 
correct for this is to assume that the variance of jη  is proportional to the first stage sampling variance 
of jα  and use weighted least squares in the second stage regression, weighted with the inverse of the 
sampling variance of jα . Such a strategy implies however that the other component of the error term 
jε  has a variance that is either 0 or proportional to jη  (Hanushek et al. (1996)). To allow a more 
flexible structure we use a specialized form of generalized least squares (GLS) in the second step. 
First, we estimate equation (ii) with ordinary least squares (OLS). Second, we run an auxiliary 
regression where we regress the square of the residuals on the sampling variance of jα  and a constant 
                                                     
8 Travelling distance is measured as the average number of kilometres from the centre of each ‘neighbourhood’ (weighted by 
population size) to the centre of the zone. Each zone is a contiguous geographical area of ‘neighborhoods’ and is intended to 
reflect a proper organization of the school district. The centre of the zone is defined as the most populous ‘neighborhood’. A 
densely populated school district will typically consist of many zones. If fewer than 2000 inhabitants live in the school 
district then the school district constitute one zone.  
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term. Finally, we use the inverse of the predicted square of residuals from this regression as the weight 
in the GLS estimation of (iii).  
2.2. Endogenous property tax 
Local governments in Norway can choose to have property taxation or not. The choice to have 
property taxation is regulated by the property tax law of June 6th, 1975. This law restricts residential 
property taxation to areas that completely or partially have the characteristics of a town (urban areas) 
or areas where such characteristics are developing (§ 3). The definition of an urban area is not clear cut 
and there are many court cases where property owners have argued that the area under taxation is not 
urban. However, residential property taxation seems to be a choice among school districts with more 
than 2500 inhabitants. Only three local governments with less than 2500 inhabitants (out of 130) use 
property tax.   
 
Since residential property taxation is voluntary among urban school districts the zero conditional mean 
assumption is most likely violated, i.e. 0j jE DPTAXω⎡ ⎤ ≠⎣ ⎦ , and differences in achievement cannot 
be causally attributed to differences in the presence of a property tax. Even with the extensive list of 
controls included on both the individual and on the school district level, a GLS estimate of β may still 
capture the effect of some omitted school district characteristic or reverse causality. Simple GLS 
estimations may be upward or downward biased. For instance, we cannot rule out the possibility that 
the quality of the school system might affect the decision to levy property taxation. If politicians 
(and/or voters) believe in a favorable incentive effect of property taxation, then perhaps ‘bad 
performing’ school districts are more likely to introduce property taxation, leading to a downward bias 
in standard GLS estimation. To address this potential endogeneity issue we need some kind of 
variation in property taxation that is arguably not subject to the choice of school district. We will 
exploit characteristics of the tax laws of 1911 (which governed the availability of property taxation 
prior to 1975) and the property tax law of 1975 to give us variation in residential property taxation, 
which seems reasonable to assume is exogenous with respect to our measure of student performance.  
2.3. Instruments for residential property taxation 
Until 1975 two tax laws existed in Norway, one for ‘towns’ and one for the ‘countryside’. Both tax 
laws, passed August 18th, 1911, included regulations regarding the use of residential property taxation. 
While residential property taxation was mandatory in towns, school districts on the countryside could 
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choose to levy residential property taxation. Until 1996, town status was assigned by the central 
government and the decision was very stable over time.9 
 
In 1911, 661 school districts existed, but several have merged since 1911, in particular due to a reform 
taking place in the 1960s.10 Based on the school district structure of 2002, 56 (out of a total number of 
434) had town status in 1911 and 45 out of these remained towns until today.11 Two school districts 
lost their town status in 1944, while the remaining nine lost it in the 1960s. Four school districts 
obtained town status after 1911 where three lost it in the reform in the 1960s. It follows that 15 school 
districts had status as a town for a shorter period between 1911 and 1975 (but they were all classified 
as towns for at least 33 consecutive years).  
 
Although residential property taxation was no longer mandatory for ‘town districts’ after the tax law 
of 1975, 4 out of 5 of the school districts that were classified as towns from 1911 till 1975 still levied 
residential property taxation in 2001. For the remaining districts, only 1 out of 5 levied residential 
property taxation. Thus to a great extent property taxation seems to be historically determined. 
 
As a first instrument for property taxation we therefore make use of the fact that some local 
governments have property taxes for exogenous reasons (old laws) and suggest a dummy variable 
which equals one if the school district was continuously classified as a town from 1911 to 1975 and 
zero otherwise (TOWN). From 1911 to 1975 (a 64 year period) 44 out of 425 school districts in our 
sample were uninterruptedly classified as a town. Township status from 1911 to 1975 identifies 
variation in property taxation that is not caused by choice. The lower panel of Table 1 illustrates the 
close relationship between ‘town status from 1911 to 1975’ and residential property tax levied in 2001.  
 
Our second instrument variable relates to the property tax law of 1975. Since the property tax law of 
1975 restricts residential property taxation to urban areas, some measure of settlement pattern also has 
the potential to work as an instrument for property tax. We pursue this strategy and introduce ‘the 
share of people living in rural areas’ (RURAL) as a second instrumental variable. The upper panel of 
                                                     
9 The Local Government Act of 1992 removed the last formal division between town and other local governments. There 
were no longer any need for the central government to assign town status, and from 1996 on, the local governments could 
choose to define themselves as towns.  From 1995 to 2005 the number of Norwegian towns increased from 46 to 93.  
10 This reform consolidated around 750 school districts into around 450.  
11 34 out of these 45 school districts had town status since 1837 when local self-government was introduced.  
10 
Table 112 shows that there is a strong relationship between residential property taxation and the ‘share 
of people living in rural areas’.13  
 
Table 1. Settlement pattern, town status (1911-1975) and residential property taxation 
Share of the population 
living in rural areas 
School districts 
with residential 
property tax 
Total number of 
school districts 
Share of school districts 
with residential property 
taxation 
Below 10%  17 34 0.50 
Between 10% and 20%  20 40 0.50 
Between 20% and 30%  14 36 0.39 
Between 30% and 40%  21 58 0.36 
Between 40% and 50%  14 49 0.29 
Between 50% and 60%  12 50 0.24 
Between 60% and 70%   7 52 0.13 
Between 70% and 80%   3 54 0.06 
Between 80% and 90%   1 16 0.06 
Between 90% and 100%   0 36 0.00 
Town status (1911-1975)    
Town  34  44 0.77 
No town  75 381 0.20 
Overall 109 425 0.26 
Note: The definition of ‘rural areas’ is provided in footnote 13. The most rural school district that 
levies residential property taxation has 81% of the population living in rural areas. The raw correlation 
between ‘town status’ and ‘the share of the population living in rural areas’ is -0.37. 
 
Our first stage regression in the two stages least squares approach (2SLS), is given by:14 
 
(iv) 2 2 2j j j j j jDPTAX RURAL TOWN R C uλ δ ϖ γ θ= + + + + +   
 
We expect ‘rural’ to have a negative impact on implementation of property tax ( 0δ < ) and ‘town’ to 
have a positive impact ( 0ϖ > ). Note that since our potential endogenous regressor, DPTAX, is binary, 
                                                     
12 Table 1 is based on the 425 school districts that are used in the empirical analysis.  
13 Statistics Norway has generated the “share of people living in rural areas” in the following way: Every household in a 
school district are assigned to a cluster of houses where each cluster is classified to be either rural or urban. For a cluster to be 
classified as urban it must fulfil two criteria: 1) the cluster of houses must contain at least 200 people, 2) The distance 
between the houses within the cluster cannot exceed 50 metres (except where houses cannot be built because of parks, rivers 
etc). 
14 It is important not to mix this first stage with the “first step” represented by equation (i).  
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it may seem appropriate to use a probit or a logit to estimate equation (iv) and obtain predicted values. 
However, as pointed out by Angrist and Krueger (2001:80), this is not necessary and may produce 
inconsistent estimates in the second stage. Hence, we rely on standard OLS to obtain consistent second 
stage estimates. 
 
The exclusion restriction | | 0j j j jE TOWN E RURALω ω⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  requires that the only effect of 
‘rural’ and ‘town’ on achievement is via the presence of a property tax. This may seem as a strong 
assumption to make for two reasons. First, student and family characteristics are likely to be correlated 
with the rural-urban dimension while simultaneously being important in determining student 
achievement. Second, economics of scale in the production of education is likely to be correlated with 
the rural-urban dimension. These are potentially confounding factors. We argue, however, that with 
the broad set of controls that we have available we are able to control properly for family and school 
district characteristics that may affect student achievement. ‘Traveling distance within zone’ is in 
particular an important control variable. It captures differences along the rural-urban dimension that 
may be important for the outcome of interest (due to scale effects), and is at the same time 
uncorrelated with the decision to have residential property taxation, given our instruments.15 The 
exclusion restriction is further investigated in section 4.2.   
3. Results  
In the first step in our estimation strategy we find the expected effects of family background 
characteristics on student achievement. In particular, we find that the achievement level increases with 
the parents’ income and educational levels. Table 2 presents the results from equation (i).    
 
                                                     
15 The raw correlation between ‘traveling distance within zone’ and the dummy for residential property taxation is -0.16. 
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Table 2.  Computation of school district fixed effects. The dependent variable is the individual 
exam result 
  Coefficient  St.error 
Girl  0.340 *** 0.006 
Age (years)  0.062 *** 0.009 
ln (family income)  0.108 *** 0.005 
Education mother (years)  0.076 *** 0.001 
Education father (years)  0.067 *** 0.001 
First or second generation immigrant –0.095 *** 0.015 
Parents non-cohabiting –0.124 *** 0.014 
Parents married  0.086 *** 0.014 
R2 0.1947 
Observations 118178 
School district fixed effects Yes 
Estimation method OLS 
Note: Included in the regression, but not reported are a constant term, a year dummy, dummies for 
different subjects, and 425 school districts fixed effects. The capital, Oslo, is the reference school 
district, which is not included in the second step. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** denote 
significance at the 1% level.  
 
The school district fixed effects, which will serve as our dependent variable in the remaining analysis, 
come out as highly jointly statistically significant. The F-statistic for joint significance equals 4.72, 
statistically significant at the 1% level. There is substantial variation in the 434 school district fixed 
effects. Compared to Oslo, the ‘worst’ and ‘best’ school districts have average achievement levels of 
around one grade lower and one grade higher, respectively.16   
 
The second step of the analysis is to estimate the effect of residential property taxation on student 
achievement, represented by the school district fixed effects. However, as discussed above we need to 
rely on instrumental variable techniques to obtain reliable inference on the causal effect of property 
taxation on student achievement. Table 3 presents results from the first stage regression given by 
equation (iv). Specification (1) and (2) report estimated coefficients when the two instrumental 
variables, ‘town’ and ‘rural’, are included separately, while both are included in specification (3). In 
line with the descriptive statistics presented in Table 1, the first stage shows that the two instruments 
                                                     
16 In the further analysis we exclude the capital Oslo because the organization of the local council differs from the rest of the 
school districts. We also drop one school district which is an extreme outlier from the first step to ensure that all estimated 
variances in the second stage are positive and another 7 school districts due to missing observations, leaving us with 425 
observations. Estimating equation (i) where we restrain the sample to include only those 425 school districts we utilize in the 
second step yields identical results.  
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are strong predictors of residential property taxation. The F-test for joint significance of the excluded 
instrument(s) in the linear probability model obtains values between 19.35 and 21.39. We conclude 
that ‘town’ and ‘rural’ do not suffer from the problems related to weak instruments. As expected 
‘traveling distance within zone’ does not come out statistically significant. 
 
Table 3.  First stage estimations: The impact of town status (1911-1975) and settlement pattern 
on the probability of levying residential property taxation. The dependent variable is a 
dummy for residential property taxation 
1 2 3 
Specification 
Coefficient  St.error Coefficient  St.error Coefficient  St.error 
Rural    -0.543 *** 0.119 0.319 *** 0.078 
Town  0.361 *** 0.079    -0.479 ** 0.118 
Teacher education hours 
per student  0.004 *** 0.002 0.004 ** 0.002 0.004 ** 0.001 
Traveling distance within 
zone -0.003  0.003 -0.001  0.003 0.000  0.003 
Enrollment  0.004  0.003 0.002  0.002 0.004  0.002 
Enrollment^2/1000 -0.028 ** 0.014 -0.017  0.014 -0.027  0.014 
Ln (school district 
population) 0.158 *** 0.039 0.163 *** 0.039 0.116 *** 0.040 
Teacher experience (years 
and months)  0.013 ** 0.007 0.013 ** 0.007 0.014 ** 0.007 
Share of population with 
lower secondary education 
as highest education 
-0.056  0.586 -0.572  0.574 -0.091  0.575 
Share of population with 
upper secondary education 
as highest education 
-0.330  0.699 -0.494  0.697 -0.246  0.686 
Unemployment rate in the 
school district 1.869  1.282 0.439  1.343 0.291  1.318 
Share of the population that 
is divorced -0.884  1.495 -0.040  1.470 -1.208  1.470 
Median income in the 
school district (in 1000 
NOK) 
-0.002  0.001 -0.006 *** 0.002 -0.005 *** 0.002 
R2 0.247 0.246 0.276 
Observations 425 425 425 
Joint significance of 
instruments, F-test (p-
value) 
21.39 (0.00) 20.81 (0.00) 19.35 (0.00) 
Estimation  method OLS OLS OLS 
Note: Included in the regressions, but not reported, is a constant term. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 4 presents the second stage results. As a benchmark for evaluating the results we provide the 
standard GLS ignoring the potential endogeneity problem related to our key explanatory variable. The 
effect of property taxation is estimated to be 0.052 and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
This result is the first indication that property taxation has a favorable incentive effect on school 
officials, stimulating them to provide effective and high quality schooling in line with arguments of 
Glaeser (1996) and Hoxby (1999). The positive and statistically significant relationship between 
property taxation and student achievement reported is confirmed when we use ’rural’ and ‘town’ as 
instruments for the dummy for residential property taxation. The point estimate increases from 0.052 
in standard GLS to 0.163 in the 2SLS estimation using both instruments simultaneously. The naïve 
GLS estimate seems to be downward biased which suggests a negative correlation between property 
tax and the disturbance term in equation (iii). The estimated coefficient for property taxation is 
considerably higher than the benchmark GLS estimation also when ‘town’ and ‘rural’ are used 
separately as instruments and the effect is statically significant at the 10% and 5% level, respectively.17 
We interpret this as evidence of property taxation having favorable incentive effects on local school 
leaders and bureaucrats. An alternative interpretation is that property taxation increases popular 
control of the bureaucrats because property taxation represents a direct and visible influence on the 
private economy of the inhabitants.  
 
                                                     
17 The main results are unaltered if we include the 15 school districts that had town status between 1911 and 1975 for 33 
years in our definition of town status as an instrument. The main results are also robust for the inclusion of the following 
variables (which had no statistically significant impact on student achievement): the share of the population that is disabled, 
the share of minority students, the share of students with special needs, the share of female teachers, the share of teachers on 
temporary contracts, the share of refugees in the school district, the average length of teacher education, the crime rate in the 
school district, political fragmentation of the local council and the share of socialists in the local council. 
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Table 4. The effect of residential property taxation on student achievement, the dependent 
variable is the school district fixed effects 
4 5 6 7 Specification  
Coeff.  St.error Coeff.  St.error Coeff.  St.error Coeff.  St.error
Property tax 0.052 *** 0.019 0.190 ** 0.090 0.138 * 0.083 0.163 ** 0.065 
Teacher education hours 
per student  -0.001  0.001 -0.002 * 0.001 -0.001 * 0.001 -0.001 * 0.001 
Traveling distance within 
zone 0.004 *** 0.002 0.005 *** 0.002 0.005 *** 0.002 0.005 *** 0.002 
Enrollment  -0.003 *** 0.001 -0.003 *** 0.001 -0.003 *** 0.001 -0.003 *** 0.001 
Enrollment^2/1000 0.011 ** 0.006 0.012 ** 0.006 0.012 * 0.006 0.012 ** 0.006 
Ln (school district 
population) 0.000  0.016 -0.032  0.027 -0.020  0.025 -0.026  0.022 
Teacher experience (years 
and months)  0.008 *** 0.003 0.006 * 0.003 0.007 ** 0.003 0.006 ** 0.003 
Share of population with 
lower secondary 
education as highest 
education 
-1.074 *** 0.242 -0.969 *** 0.265 -1.009 *** 0.255 -0.990 *** 0.256 
Share of population with 
upper secondary 
education as highest 
education 
-0.711 ** 0.290 -0.629 ** 0.312 -0.660 ** 0.301 -0.645 ** 0.304 
Unemployment rate in the 
school district -0.656  0.572 -1.058  0.659 -0.906  0.632 -0.979  0.622 
Share of the population 
that is divorced -1.476 ** 0.615 -1.590 ** 0.657 -1.547 ** 0.634 -1.567 ** 0.642 
Median income in the 
school district (in 1000 
NOK) 
-0.001  0.001 0.000  0.001 0.000  0.001 0.000  0.001 
R2 0.189    
Observations 425 425 425 425 
Instrument(s) for property 
tax  TOWN RURAL TOWN, RURAL 
Sargan’s test (p-value)    0.21 (0.64) 
Estimation  method GLS GLS - IV GLS - IV GLS – 2SLS 
Note: Included in the regressions, but not reported, is a constant term. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Although we are primarily interested in testing whether there are beneficial incentive effects of 
property taxation, it is interesting to evaluate how large this effect may be. An increase in average 
student achievement of 0.163 grading points, as suggested by our main specification (7), corresponds 
to (slightly above) one standard deviation increase in the school district fixed effects. The disciplining 
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effect of property taxation on school leaders leads to a one grading point increase for around one out 
of six students. Although the standard error related to the estimated effect of property taxation on 
student achievement is admittedly quite large, the incentive effect seems to be substantial.  
4. Sensitivity analysis 
4.1. Resource use and the disciplining effect of property taxation 
A potential critique of our central result might be that revenue from property taxation yields increased 
spending in the education sector, which our resource use variable fails to capture. This may be 
important if increased spending increases student performance. To further investigate whether this 
may be a relevant critique, we have run an additional regression where ‘expenditures per student’ is 
included as an alternative resource measure. The property tax effect is basically unaltered when 
‘teacher hours per student’ is substituted with ‘expenditures per student’ (specification (8) in Table 5). 
In line with a large literature, we find that resource use do not seem to have any impact on student 
performance (e.g. Hanushek, 2002). However, since resource use is likely to be endogenous we are not 
necessarily obtaining the causal effect of resource on student achievement. The important point in our 
setting is that the estimated effect of property taxation is very robust to different definitions of 
resource use and also that the effect is unaltered if we exclude measures of resource use (specification 
(9) in Table 5). Finally we investigate whether the effect of resource use is dependent on the cost 
structure in the school district, by interacting our measure of resource use with ‘traveling distance’, 
‘enrollment’ and ‘enrollment^2’. These measures are likely to capture potential differing cost effects 
across districts in the production of education. We find some support in favor a differential effect of 
resource use. In particular, the positive sign of the interaction effect of enrollment^2 and ‘teacher 
hours per student’ suggest that the resource use effect is increasing non-linearly in enrollment. As an 
example, consider two school districts where one has an average (student weighted) school size 
(‘enrollment’) of 28 and the other has an average (student weighted) school size of 78. These numbers 
correspond to the first and third quartile in ‘enrollment’. Based on specification (11), the effect of 
increasing ‘teacher hours per student’ with one standard deviation (18 hours) is estimated to be -0.007 
for the district with small schools and 0.081 for the district with large schools. But, most importantly 
in our setting, allowing for a differential effect of resource use based on traveling distance or 
enrollment leave the estimated impact of property taxation on student achievement basically unaltered.  
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Table 5. The effect of residential property taxation on student achievement, further 
investigations of the role of resource use. The dependent variable is the school district 
fixed effects. 
8 9 10 11 
Specification  
Coeff.  St.error Coeff.  St.error Coeff.  St.error Coeff.  St.error
Property tax 0.161 ** 0.066 0.162 ** 0.065 0.171 *** 0.063 0.153 *** 0.063 
Teacher education hours 
per student        -0.001  0.001 -0.001  0.001 
Expenditures per student 0.001  0.001          
Traveling distance within 
zone 0.004 ** 0.002 0.004 *** 0.002 0.015 * 0.008 0.005 *** 0.002 
(Traveling 
distance*Teacher 
education hours per 
student)/100 
      -0.010  0.008    
Enrollment  -0.002 * 0.001 -0.002 ** 0.001 -0.003 *** 0.001 0.001  0.004 
Enrollment^2/1000 0.009  0.006 0.010 * 0.006 0.012 ** 0.006 -0.053  0.0033
(Enrollment*Teacher 
education hours per 
student)/1000 
         -0.007  0.005 
(Enrollment^2*Teacher 
education hours per 
student)/1000 
         0.001 ** 0.000 
Ln (school district 
population) -0.017  0.022 -0.020  0.022 -0.026  0.022 -0.019  0.021 
Teacher experience (years 
and months)  0.007 ** 0.003 0.007 ** 0.003 0.006 ** 0.003 0.006 ** 0.003 
Share of population with 
lower secondary education  
as highest education 
-0.929 *** 0.259 -0.942 ** 0.257 -0.968 *** 0.257 -0.997 *** 0.252 
Share of population with 
upper secondary education  
as highest education 
-0.521 * 0.309 -0.574 * 0.304 -0.646 ** 0.306 -0.618 ** 0.301 
Unemployment rate in the 
school district -1.108 * 0.630 -1.102 * 0.628 -0.937  0.631 -0.792  0.612 
Share of the population 
that is divorced -1.799 *** 0.645 -1.716 *** 0.642 -1.495 ** 0.650 -1.608 ** 0.637 
Median income in the 
school district (in 1000 
NOK) 
0.000  0.001 0.000  0.001 0.000  0.001 0.000  0.001 
Observations 423 425 425 425 
Instrument(s) for property 
tax TOWN, RURAL TOWN, RURAL TOWN, RURAL TOWN, RURAL 
Sargan’s test (p-value) 0.37 (0.54) 0.33 (0.58) 0.18 (0.67) 0.18 (0.67) 
Estimation  method GLS – 2SLS GLS – 2SLS GLS – 2SLS GLS – 2SLS 
Note: Included in the regressions, but not reported, is a constant term. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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4.2. Empirical investigation of the exclusion restriction 
The validity of the identification strategy pursued in this analysis rests on the assumption that ‘rural’ 
and ‘town’ are excludable from our structural equation in the sense that they relate to student 
achievement only through their influence on residential property taxation. The key challenge for 
obtaining reliable inference is that differences along the rural-urban dimension still exist even after 
conditioning on the broad set of controls that we have available. If this is the case, ‘rural’ and ‘town’ 
are invalid as instruments and should be included in the second stage regression, rather than in the first 
stage regression. According to the Sargan instrument validity test, this does not seem to be a relevant 
critique. The test fails to reject the null that our instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in all 
specifications (with p-values above 0.5 in all specifications). However, since it is widely 
acknowledged that overidentification tests have low power in certain settings, we also cut the sample 
according to property tax status and run the following ‘second step’ regressions:  
 
(v) 2 2j j j j j jRURAL TOWN R Cα λ ϕ φ γ θ ω= + + + + +   
 
If our exclusion restriction is valid then ‘rural’ and ‘town’ should not have any impact on student 
achievement when we condition on the decision to have property taxation (and the other control 
variables). Results from these regressions are reported in Appendix Table 2. The effects of ‘rural’ and 
‘town’ on student achievement are statistically insignificant both for the sample of school districts 
with property taxation and for school districts without property taxation. We conclude that unobserved 
differences across the rural-urban dimension do not seem to be driving our main result.  
5. Conclusion 
Several researchers have asserted that inefficiency in the public sector arises from a lack of incentives 
to behave efficiently. When output is not well defined, as in the education sector, it may be hard to 
detect inefficient production. Monitoring may simply be too difficult. Residential property taxation 
may help overcome this problem by establishing a direct relationship between the tax level and the 
benefits received by taxpayers through capitalization of public sector quality into house prices.   
 
Although no developed theory in economics shows explicitly how school districts should organize the 
school sector to improve student performance, it is reasonable to argue that school leaders, as other 
economic agents, take into account costs and benefits when they take actions. School leaders may, for 
example, be more concerned about student achievement when the school district is partly financed 
through property taxation and therefore put more effort into hiring good teachers. In this paper, we 
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empirically evaluate the relevance of property taxation as an incentive device on local governments. 
We do not aim to establish which explicit channels the incentive mechanisms of property taxation 
work through, rather we seek to establish whether there are such beneficial effects.  
 
Utilizing a well-suited data set from the educational sector in Norway, we found evidence that students 
living in school districts levying residential property taxation perform better at the nationally decided 
external examination than other students. The main result holds when we utilize variation in property 
taxation driven by the tax laws from 1911 and the property tax law from 1975 in a two stage least 
squares framework. All the results presented in this analysis corroborate the theoretical framework put 
forward by Glaeser (1996) and Hoxby (1999) well. These studies emphasize that local property 
taxation gives bureaucrats incentives to maintain an efficient and well functioning public sector by 
stronger linking public sector quality to public sector financing. The current analysis shows that these 
theoretically consistent mechanisms also seem to matter in practice.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Summary statistics and data description 
Variable Mean Standard deviation 
Individual characteristics (N=118178)   
Girl 0.49 0.50 
Age (years) 14.52 0.30 
ln (family income) 13.27 0.66 
Education mother (years) 11.82 2.71 
Education father (years) 11.96 2.85 
First or second generation immigrant 0.04 0.20 
Parents non-cohabiting 0.30 0.46 
Parents married 0.65 0.48 
School district characteristics (N=425)   
School district fixed effects -0.015 a 0.136 a 
Property tax, dummy taking the value 1 for school districts levying residential 
property tax 0.256 0.437 
Teacher education hours per student  85.39 17.83 
Expenditures per student  (in 1000 NOK) 64.626 13.733 
Traveling distance within zoneb 8.135 6.964 
Enrollment  54.87 34.77 
Enrollment squared/1000c   4.42 4.99 
Teacher experience (years and months)c  19.27 2.98 
Ln (school district population) 8.483 1.069 
The share of the population (16–74 years) with completed lower secondary 
education as highest educational level 0.209 0.056 
The share of the population (16–74 years) with completed upper secondary 
education as highest educational level 0.621 0.041 
Unemployment rate in the school district (yearly average) 0.034 0.019 
The share of the population that is divorced or separated 0.063 0.017 
Median income in the school district for persons 17 years and older (in 1000 
NOK) 195.101 20.977 
Note: a weighted with the inverse of the sampling variance from the first step, b defined in footnote 8,c student 
weighted average. The data on residential property taxation is collected in a survey carried out in 2001. Data on 
student achievement are from the Norwegian Board of Education. The other data are provided by the Norwegian 
Social Science Data Services and Statistics Norway. Neither of these institutions is responsible for the analysis 
conducted or for the conclusions drawn. 
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